Abstract: A device of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) has restricted computational resources, and is always deployed in a harsh, unattended or hostile environment. This investigation presented the time-division secret key protocol for wireless sensor networking to detect denial-of-service (DoS) attack. Simulation results indicate that detect DoS attack and cipher function can be effectively applied to WSNs. The simulation results indicate that after running for 400 s, a detection jamming scheme still alive with 160 nodes, but the one with only 50 nodes does. This result demonstrates that a detection jamming scheme can extend the network lifetime when the WSN security is adopted.
Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) comprises hundreds or thousands of networked sensor nodes [1] [2] [3] . These sensor nodes are battery-constrained and have limited computational capacity. They consist of many functions for monitoring a wide variety of surrounding conditions and collecting highprecision data, including light, humidity, temperature, magnet, acoustic, pressure and voice-level information. A sensor node in a WSN may act not only as a data generator to sense interesting data, but also as a gateway to deliver data to the next hop. Fig. 1 shows the basic WSN architecture, which includes hundreds or thousands of nodes, and the monitoring terminal, called a sink. All sensor nodes are randomly spread across the entire geographical area and are assigned to detect interesting environmental activities. They cooperate with other nodes around them by establishing direct data dissemination path to sinks along wireless channels. A sink may be a stationary sensor node full of powerful abilities or a mobile hardware device to gather messages. As sinks accumulate messages successfully, they process and forward essential data to managers through the Internet.
Since sensor nodes are low-cost and tiny, a sensor network comprises hundreds to several thousands of small sensor nodes scattered throughout an area of interest. Owing to the large number of sensor nodes, the nodes densities are high and large amounts of data are produced. Thus, large-scale data management techniques are required. The sensor node generally cannot recharge, and the battery life is not expected to rise significantly. Reducing power consumption and achieving efficient power savings are essential in sensor networks. The data encryption is limited at the power supply. The data encryption in a WSN is very important. The WSN security issue is a focus in this study.
Background knowledge
This section presents some accounts of wireless mobile sensor network properties, cluster-based routing protocol and related survey of security issue. This information is a basis for the proposed mechanism.
Wireless mobile sensor network
A sensor node comprises four basic components: sensing, processing, transceiver and power units. The processing unit, which is generally associated with a small storage unit including ROM and RAM, manages the procedures to execute the assigned jobs. A transceiver unit connects the node to the network and communicates with other nodes. Power units may be powered only by batteries, or by solar power generators. These components may be integrated in device with volumes in the order of mm 3 in the near future. Sensor nodes are typically located within a sensor field, as shown in Fig. 2 . Data are sent to a receiver through a sink via a multi-hop infrastructure. The sink can communicate with a task management node via the Internet. The communication protocol usually includes mobility management, power management and task management. A mobility manager determines and registers the status of sensor nodes. The power manager determines the amount of power used. The task manager schedules tasks within a sensor region. Power efficiency is always an important consideration.
Sensor network routing architecture
Clustering is a significant research topic in WSNs. The clustering means that wireless sensor nodes are grouped into an easily controllable network infrastructure. Clustering provides a good framework for power control, lower interference and efficient channel utilisation [4, 5] . Cluster technology which reduces energy consumption for scalability for hundreds or thousands of nodes is very useful for many applications. Applications that require efficient data aggregation are natural candidates for clustering. Many studies have addressed routing, energy efficiency, management and huge scale control based on clustering methods. Clustering executed for data fusion, information filtering and aggregation tasks, such as periodic calculation of temperature of a cluster coverage region, reduces communication overhead.
This study focuses on the routing based on cluster structure. To accomplish the routing protocol, the clustering method in [6] is adopted to perform the clustering in advance. The clustering algorithm is an intelligent self-organisation management of higher level nodes. Participating member nodes using multi-hop hierarchical clusters use the 20/80 rule to determine the number of heads of nodes. Furthermore, broadcasting a minimum number of tree hops is constructed.
Sensor network security
As the deployment of sensor networks becomes increasingly widespread, security issues become a central concern. WSNs have some limitations, including limited storage, power and communication capability, massive large-scale sensor node deployment and variable network topology. Many challenges currently exist for protocol design features that guide the establishment of a secure communications infrastructure. A group of sensor nodes may pre-initialise some secret information, despite no prior direct contact with sensor nodes. A solution for WSN security must meet the requirements of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, freshness, scalability, availability, flexibility and selforganisation [7 -11] .
Related works
Traditional network security solutions-trusted third parties, based on the infrastructure, should not use large WSNs, owing to the unknown network topology before deployment, communication range limitations, intermittent sensor-node operation and network dynamics. Security has become a topic of interest in WSNs research during the past few years, and a number of solutions for securing WSN have been proposed. This section reviews the related work on security issues in a WSN from three aspects: key management, identity authentication and attacks countermeasures.
Key management:
A key management program is an important component of network security. Key security solutions must maintain contact with an opponent. Additionally, a sensor network will have intelligent energy and calculation constraints, thus requiring a balanced security level to be maintained with respect to those constraints [12] . The proposed scheme depends on the probability that a random graph is shared by nodes, and applies a simple method for shared key discovery, path key establishment, key revocation and re-enter [13, 14] .
In [15] the authors proposed a key management protocol for sensor networks, localised encryption and authentication protocol (LEAP), which supports network processing and immediately limits the security impact of node compromise by intrusive neighbours. The communication protocol is used to establish and update these keys, energy efficiency and minimise base-station participation. The LEAP agreement includes highly efficient communication between nodes and certification is based on the use of a one-way key chain.
In [16] the authors proposed a scalable key management scheme designed for sensor networks, in which sensor nodes are deployed in a large, random and anonymous way. The proposed scheme depends on the location-based virtual network infrastructure, which is established by combining group key management issues. The main functions of this scheme are autonomic computing of group keys and dynamic computing of the mapping of a node to a group key using a simple hash function. The scheme has a good plan network size, supports the dynamic structure setup and manages the security of group communication at any scale in WSNs.
Some deployment knowledge may be available in many practical situations. Reference [17] has proposed a novel random key pre-distribution scheme that uses deployment knowledge and eliminates needless key assignments. That scheme markedly increases sensor network performance, including connectivity and flexibility in capturing a node network.
Identity authentication:
As sensor network is ultimately the small and low-power devices, a traditional authentication framework is not appropriate for public key encryption. The limited computing and storage resources of sensor nodes mean that an alternative authentication method based on a public key certificate is required. An authenticated broadcast requires an asymmetric mechanism to overcome damage to any receiver from sending messages. Unfortunately, the limited resources of the sensor device are not sufficient because the asymmetric encryption mechanism has a higher computing, communications and storage overhead.
In [13] the authors proposed mTESLA by bringing in asymmetric through a delayed disclosure of a symmetric key, resulting in an effective method for broadcast authentication. As some have noted, mTESLA is not suitable for authentication traffic between inter-nodes because mTESLA does not provide direct verification. Both the delay and storage requirements verify that the program is not suitable for all traffic, and has little time to authenticate information broadcast by a base station. The proposed is a one-way key chain certification program, providing a solution to this problem. A prominent feature of this scheme is supported source authentication, network processing and passive participation.
Reference [18] noted that the initial mTESLA distribution needs certain information. With the limited bandwidth of WSNs, this initial unicast-based distribution markedly limits applications of mTESLA to large WSNs. Additionally, this work proposes a novel method to replace unicast-based initialisation and broadcast-based, and examines several techniques for improving performance, stability and security methods. The resulting protocol has many advantages, such as low overhead, tolerance of message loss, scalable to large networks, and is robust against a number of known anti-replay attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
Attacks

DoS attack:
A DoS attack is defined as any event that reduces or eliminates the ability of a sensor network to fulfil its intended function. A DoS attack can be hardware failure, software error, resource depletion, owing to environmental conditions, or any complex interaction among these factors [19] . Reference [20] presented a typical sensor network level and introduced the type of each layer of the DoS attack and defence capabilities.
Sybil attack:
In [21] 
Wormhole attack:
A wormhole attack is defined as a tunnel of foe, which receives a message in a part of the network in low-latency links and replays them in different parts. The most common wormhole attack is via the collusion of malicious nodes involved in the distance between their forwards packets from a channel along the direction. Reference [22] developed a scheme that detects wormhole attacks; however, this scheme requires very rigid time synchronisation and consequently, it is not feasible for most sensor networks. Moreover, they proposed a novel general mechanism called packet detection leash that resists wormhole attacks.
HELLO flood attack:
A node receiving messages through a packet may assume it is within the radio range of the sender. However, this assumption may be incorrect. For example, a laptop-class attacker has enough transmission power to broadcast a packet to each node to persuade an opponent in a network that it is a neighbour. The simplest method to protect against Hello flooding by an attacker is to verify a two-way link before taking meaningful action.
Proposed mechanism
A sensor network is a collection of a large numbers of sensor nodes that work collaboratively in a structure for multi-hop wireless communication. This section presents a method to detect and defend a DoS attack and data authenticationencryption. Practical solutions are presented in the following issues: † detecting DoS attacks; † aetting up sleeping mode and cancelling a sleep mode of sensor nodes; † authenticating messages.
Jamming attack
A common method of attack is jamming, which means using radio frequencies to interfere with the operation of a wireless network. An adversary can disrupt an entire network. This attack is simple and effective for single-frequency networks. All data generated by a receiver node and collected from sensor nodes and then forwards data to the user or an external network. The number of the nodes close to the sink is limited, and these nodes relay many more messages than do others. Therefore when a sensor receiver is close to failure, the network is expected as early as in other energy consumption. This causes a receiver to disconnect from the sensor network when attacks continue, or when any other sensor node has exhausted the battery, as shown in Fig. 3 .
Anti-nodes can be fixed or mobile. They can use the value of fixed local identity or adjust their identifications as frequently as they require. A mobile anti-node that frequently adjusts its identification value is harder to detect than a fixed node. The problem with this approach is that when a node is compromised, the security of the entire network is destroyed. Additionally, the refresh key becomes too expensive due to communication overhead. However, this is the common case in practice.
Detect and defend DoS attacks scheme
Wireless networks are generally deployed in unfriendly surroundings, and are often subjected to greater security risks. As sensor nodes have limited computing and power resources, a key distribution scheme, such as public key algorithm is needed. This section explains how to defend against DoS attacks. The proposed method mainly consists of detecting the DoS messages to sleep mode and authenticating the messages in the WSN.
A WSN can be attacked by anti-nodes scattered randomly inside or close to it. A node can detect jamming broadcast messages generated by anti-nodes in two ways. The problem with this approach is that when a node is compromised, the security of the entire network is destroyed. Additionally, the refresh key becomes too expensive due to communication overhead. The second method is to compare a node's report generation frequency with that of the neighbouring nodes. In this case, the packet generation rate of the overall sensor network can be adopted to detect the DoS attacks. The number of data packets arriving at the nodes in excess of an acceptable level may indicate a possible DoS attack. A sensor node turns into sleep mode instantly (as shown in Fig. 4 ). The power of sensor nodes can be saved in sleep mode. When sensor node is attacked by anti-node, it cannot send any messages to the others and the sink. When a sensor wakes up, it first checks whether it is being attacked by an antinode, then sends messages.
Time division secret key
The sensor network encryption protocol (SNEP) has several advantages [23] . First, SNEP communication overhead is lower. Second, SNEP adopts a counter maintaining the state at both sensor nodes. Third, SNEP achieves a strong security property that prevents eavesdroppers from the encrypted message. In this study the SNEP is combined with time-division secret key message exchange to enhance WSN security. In this study, each message was of 8 bytes.
Data encryption and decryption model
The traditional functions were adopted for both encryption and decryption. The encryption and decryption model of block ciphers, shown in Fig. 5 , has this property. Additionally, encryption and decryption model is based on a stream cipher. Hence, the cipher text is exactly the size of the plain text, and not a multiple of the block size. This property is especially desirable in our environment. Messages are very expensive to send and receive in terms of energy. Additionally, longer messages have a higher probability of data corruption. Therefore using a block cipher for message expansion is not desirable. The encryption and decryption model requires a running counter. Reuse of counter value severely reduced security. The following notation is adopted to describe security protocols and cryptographic operations in this study.
Time-division secret key protocol (TDSKP)
Safe message transmission is very important in a WSN environment. To prevent data eavesdropping, injection of news messages, or replaying and changing old messages by adversary, the data transmission between sensor nodes are necessary. Wireless sensor networking requires authentication messages. The traditional security protocol is adopted for both encryption and decryption, since the secret keys are simple to decipher in reasonable time. To achieve decipher by secret key, this study presents a novel TDSKP, which solves the problem of secret key being simple to decipher.
Sensor network time synchronisation
The network time protocol server (NTS) is inserted into the WSN [24] . The main function of NTS is synchronising the time of all sensor nodes, and it is powerful machinery (as shown in Fig. 6 ). The time between sensor nodes and time server are initially set to bootstrap. The sensor node first checks with the time sever, in a process of 'wireless sensor nodes time synchronisation'. The sensor node is adopted to perform time-checking and can also synchronise the system time. The secret keys can be exchanged accurately during sensor node synchronisation (as shown in Table 1 ).
Simulation and discussions
The simulation environment is described in this section to investigate the performance of the data encryption and defend attacks of security scheme. To measure the energy consumption, sensor nodes were created by the proposed security method for different number of energy bits. The defend DoS attack expressed how to determine known DoS attacks. The system lifetime was measured from the number of anti-node attacks to determine the number of live nodes. The packet transmission ratio denotes the ratio between number of node transmission received by the destination and the number sent by the source.
Simulation environment
The proposed method was simulated in TinyOS with various numbers of sensor nodes. The proposed system model assumes the use of UC Berkeley's SmartDust and underlying MAC 802.11 DCF sensor nodes in the system. The default simulation used 200 nodes, and the anti-node attack range was set to 250 m, which were randomly Fig. 7 shows the energy consumption plot for the proposed method as a function of the number of bits. The power consumption for the proposed scheme is in the order of a few sensor nodes of processing 8 bits at a time providing tremendous energy saving compared to the cryptographic schemes. An eight-bit key is adopted to reduce the unnecessary energy consumption and to extend the network lifetime. The simulation results present the energy consumption profile for the tested traditions public key encryption methods.
System energy consumption
Detect and defend DoS attacks analysis
An experiment was performed with 10 sources and a simulation time of 350 s. The maximum packets transmission of the sensor nodes could be achieved in 75 s. A sensor node was switched into sleep mode when it was 15% over the maximum packet quantity. Fig. 8 shows the estimated maximum transmission network packets for the sensor node.
System lifetime
The simulation was performed with no sensor node mobility with a simulation time ranging from 0 to 400 s. Fig. 9 plots the node lifetimes by defend DoS scheme during each simulation time. The defend DoS scheme can extend the network lifetime by the WSN security architecture. The defend DoS scheme can manage nodes effectively, and the wireless sensor node can thus reduce unnecessary energy consumption.
Conclusion
This investigation presented the TDSKP for WSN, to detect DoS attack. Some anti-nodes can be deployed by a defender in a tactical sensor network, which creates DoS traffic and through the relay of spam to waste WSNs energy. A node can detect jamming broadcast messages generated by anti-nodes. If the number of data packets arriving at the nodes exceeds an acceptable level, then the sensor node switches to sleep mode instantly. The traditional cipher function is adopted to save code space, computational capability, power and memory. Moreover, the NTS is inserted into the WSN to synchronise the time of all sensor nodes, exchanging secret key synchronal without inaccuracy. Simulation results indicate that detect DoS attack and cipher function can be effectively applied to WSNs. The simulation results indicate that after running for 400 s, a detection jamming scheme still alive with 160 nodes, but the one with only 50 nodes does. This result demonstrates that a detection jamming scheme can extend the network lifetime when the WSN security is adopted.
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